Air Power and it's role in modern warfare

Well my two cents : Air Power is merely one of the factors.......and one not even close to the 4-5 most important ones..... which come in to play in the very complex "equation" at the basis of the variation in the military balance in a conflict between highly advanced peer/near-pear opponents.

WWII was the last historical example where peer opponents fought one against the other.
Then ground superiority proved itself orders of magnitude more important and crucial than air superiority even more if we take in consideration that the very bulk of the conflict was mostly fought and won on the eastern front where the balance between the patriotic BBC and Luftwaffe was strongly lopsided in enemy favour, naturally the strategic moment when the balance on the ground begun to slowly shift in РККА's favour, progressively faster the strategic balance of the conflict too shifted equally in our favour until a very fast defeat of Third Reich.

The post Great Patriotic War military history cannot provide neither a true staple neither a reliable standard to ascertain the real importance of Air Forces in influencing the outcome of a conflict between peers, that for the very simple reason that always those conflicts involved opponents separated by a crushing difference in military technology and/or weight.

In this global environment Air Forces became progressively more "popular" as military mean to achieve politic aims for the very limited amount of losses involved in its employment against backwarded opponents (both in terms of air defence systems/air forces and long range missiles capable to assure the destruction of the airbases in the theatre).

The attempt to enormously “blow up” the importance of Air Force is always present in western narrative,for the simple reason that the heavily split, intercontinetal, geographical  composition of the major western  alliance  -NATO- has not only prevented the formation of unified ground forces armies capable to represent anymore than a momentary hindrance to Soviet Army ,but forced also it to invest extensively and almost exclusively in easily deployable/redeployable forces and equipment ,first among all aircraft.

From this forced strategic choice descended also the pressing need to construct an enormous amount of spread-out related infrascrutures -in particular air bases- for which was at the time and is impossible still today to provide  for NATO any kind of effective IAD coverage.  

Taking into account what just said is simple to understand why the inherently wronged idea that Air Forces would achieve today ,in a conflict between peer opponents, any better result than what achieved in the last major conflict is so strongly pushed and promoted in western media and ….…..at least publicly…..in the declarations of western military officials.

Factual reality and cold data talk obviously of a totally different history : in facts even in the post WWII period and just in those conflicts always characterized by a crushing technological/numerical superiority enjoyed by a side on the other, merely the presence of one relatively up-do –date ground based air defense system……i repeat, only one model and not the several dozen different ones representing a full IAD as well its auxiliary and aid assets……,even if in its heavily scaled down export version and in a density
much lower than what established in the  ПВО doctrinal structure, was sufficient to generate unsustainable aircraft losses on practically the most advanced and well trained “western” Air Forces : US Air Forces and Israeli Air Force, how well explained by Виталий Носов:



“Почему на Ваш взгляд, действия систем ПВО советского производства в Ираке и Югославии были малоуспешны. Оказало ли это негативное влияние на продвижение российской техники на мировой рынок? Есть ли вообще перспективы систем ПВО, которые основаны на принципах активной радиолокации. Не являются ли более перспективными системы ПВО с пассивными (телевизионными, инфракрасными) датчиками или основанные на принципе бистатической и мультистатической радиолокации?

Позвольте обратить ваше внимание на тот факт, что за многолетнюю историю противостояния средств ПВО советского производства и зарубежных средств воздушного нападения только в двух конфликтах в равном бою встречалось оружие одного поколения с той и с другой стороны - во Вьетнаме в 1965-1972 годах и на Ближнем Востоке в октябре 1973 года. И почему-то многие забыли, что успехи средств ПВО были тогда более чем впечатляющими. Так, например, только за один 1972 год во Вьетнаме огнем средств ПВО советского производства было сбито более 400 самолетов, из них 223 современнейших на то время самолета F-4 "Фантом" и 51 стратегический бомбардировщик B-52. За 10 дней октября 1973 года только в Сирии и только ЗРК "Квадрат" было сбито 64 израильских самолета. Именно значительные потери американской авиации в 1972 году в небе над Ханоем наряду с другими причинами заставили США подписать соглашение о прекращении боевых действий.

Во время боевых действий в Ираке и Югославии на поле боя друг другу противостояли системы оружия разных поколений: со стороны стран западного альянса самые последние образцы средств воздушного нападения, поддерживаемые мощной системой воздушно-космической разведки и радиоэлектронного противодействия, а с другой стороны - система ПВО, построенная на основе устаревших ЗРК и РЛС, практически не имевших АСУ, средств радио- и радиотехнической разведки и средств РЭБ, без поддержки с воздуха, без подавления авиации на аэродромах и т.п. Имели место случаи неполного использования возможностей комплексов при их боевом применении. В настоящее время кардинальным образом изменились требования к системам и средствам ПВО, подходы к построению системы ПВО и нестратегической ПРО в целом, поэтому никакими героическими усилиями ни иракские, ни югославские специалисты, располагая старым парком вооружения, построить эффективной группировки ПВО не могли. Эти очевидные факты никем не игнорируются, поэтому события в Ираке и Югославии не только не оказали негативного влияния на продвижение российской техники ПВО на мировой рынок, а наоборот, способствовали резкому возрастанию интереса к ней со стороны потенциальных покупателей.

Отвечая на вторую часть вопроса, напомню, что может быть эффективной только та система ПВО, которая включает в себя оптимальное сочетание различных огневых комплексов, РЛС, АСУ средств РЭБ, систем радио- и радиотехнической разведки, работающих в различных диапазонах дальностей, высот, частот, использующих различные способы и принципы обнаружения, пеленгации, сопровождения и наведения, в том числе и перечисленные в Вашем вопросе. Чрезмерное же увлечение каким-то одним новым направлением, или полный отказ от использования старых и проверенных принципов может пагубно сказаться на устойчивости или эффективности системы ПВО в целом."


In those unique post WWII instances where the most advanced, well equipped ,well manned and numerous western Air Forces have confronted a very limited amount of an export version of a single model of relatively up-to-date AD system, not taking into account the total absence of any kind of offensive mean capable to attack directly the western air bases in the theatre (all of them not hardened in any way, devoid of even only the most elementary simulacrum of an IAD at theirs defense and literally overcrowded of an absurd number of very soft skin aircraft, immense amount of fuel and of openly exposed ammunition) only the successful holding of the US and Israeli forces on the ground – in particular for the Yom Kippur conflict – prevented an all-out defeat.

With enemy enjoying ground superiority those conflicts ,and very likely also the majority of those where even only a single relatively up-to-date AD model was not present, would have resulted in the complete military collapse and the flattening of all the asset and structures in the thetre of operation in a matter of few days.

"All in all and as a result of my essay I would say that air power definitely will be essential to winning modern wars in the recent age and upcoming ages of warfare. The boiling point is that none of the other services could ever reach the comparative advantages that evolve from air powers’ unique capabilities. "

TY, TY Airman Third Class Tobias Dobrowolski of German Air Force , whoever da hell are you...

Was in Sovietunion or Russia ever plans to create a gunship like AC-130? I know Russia has the Mil Mi-24 serving as a gunship, but the AC-130 has a few advantages even a few disadvanteges.

GarryB wrote:To be honest I doubt it.
Not that it would be hard as they have plenty of aircraft types that would be suitable... the new MTA or the old An-12 would be of suitable size and of course in terms of actual weapons a 120mm gun/mortar, a 57mm gun high velocity new gun, plus 23mm and 30mm gatling guns in abundance... but I rather expect other platforms to be rather more use in such a role.

Helicopter gunships, CAS aircraft, and artillery... as well as bomb trucks like the Tu-22M3 and Su-34 and Su-24 are all able to hit targets accurately... even long range rocket artillery like 300mm Smerch and Tochka and Iskander...

Their airborne forces are fully armoured... having transport vehicles and also vehicles with direct and indirect fire heavy guns means more firepower moves with the forces and so less needs to be sent to support them.

Fixed wing gunship is very specific by its role and you cant really compare it to frontline bombers or any kind of artillery. Its huge loiter time, very high payload of conventional and cheap payload, plenty of space for optronics compared to other platforms, great crew comfort, ability to act as command post... makes it very unique.

There are drawbacks too, as it cant be operated if enemy has air supremacy, if enemy has major air defence assets (still were used in Vietnam despite that), require at least well prepared airstrips...

If soviets had fixed wing gunship aircraft in Afghanistan, it would have helped alot more than their bombing runs did.

GarryB wrote:

Fixed wing gunship is very specific by its role and you cant really compare it to frontline bombers or any kind of artillery. Its huge loiter time, very high payload of conventional and cheap payload, plenty of space for optronics compared to other platforms, great crew comfort, ability to act as command post... makes it very unique.

Only makes it unique for a western weapon system in terms of being relatively cheap. In terms of firepower the 105mm gun lobs 20kg HE shells... well the Su-25 carries 240mm rockets with heavier payloads (125kgs)... and the other guns are interesting but nothing that cannot be delivered by other means.

There are drawbacks too, as it cant be operated if enemy has air supremacy, if enemy has major air defence assets (still were used in Vietnam despite that), require at least well prepared airstrips...

The Laotian dragon or the great Laotian truck eater was a myth fabricated to explain the huge difference in the number of targets (trucks and vehicles) claimed killed by gunships, and the number of wrecks found on the battlefield after an attack... its publicity was often rather better than its actual performance.

And it was horribly vulnerable to MANPADS.

Something like Tunguska or Pantsir would be devastating to it...

If soviets had fixed wing gunship aircraft in Afghanistan, it would have helped alot more than their bombing runs did.

Not really... big slow aircraft are horribly vulnerable to MANPADS...

When Stinger arrived they switched to artillery... which meant more dead Afghans because of the lower accuracy, but the US didn't care about that.


Very much a niche weapon.

For the Russians they would more likely have BMDs with their 30mm cannons and 100mm rifled guns in the direct fire role on the ground with the troops instead of fixed wing support aircraft...

Americans fly AC-130s at 3.600m during combat and 7000m+ on approach which makes them out of reach of MANPADS an virtially any AAA that is active today.

Soviets in Afghanistan had nothing that offered loiter time, literally nothing, even Su-25s flew strike missions and went away, only platform that stayed around was Mi-24 and we know how well that went. Sure, gunships are vulnerable aganist SHORAD-s, but if you have effective SEAD... and its not something you fly in where you expect active AD.

There are atm like 17 or so active gunships in whole USAF, its platfrom with specific role.

Like Militarov wrote loiter time is the critical point. Ok, of course you can't use gunships in heavy defended areas, but for example Syria is the place there gunships could have done good work in some places. You can surpress enemy movement and allow your own allied troops to march forward. Of course gunships fill a niche and nothing more, but they bring cheap a lot of firepower to a less defended place.

And by the way, gunships are not soo sensitive to manpads as thought. The concept of the AC-130 is very robust and simple, only a direct and lucky hit would cause a lot of trouble.

For Russian Air Force a few gunships 5 to 10 would be pefect against low level enemies, in a conflict against powerful enemy of course useless. In Syria they could hammer some parts of frontline. In some enclaves manpads are really really rare. In general it would be cheaper to let gunships hammer some frontlines, than Tu-22M3 coming direct from Russia.